We consider the retailer's store brand (SB) positioning problem in a market with two national brand (NB) competitors. Our game-theoretic model indicates that the optimal strategy for the retailer is to position the store brand right on top of the leading national brand. Even when facing two equally strong brands, the retailer is better off targeting one of the national brands rather than adopting a mid-point positioning. Positioning the store brand closer to the leading national brand increases the cross price sensitivity between the two, and leads to (a) lower wholesale prices from both the leading (NB1) and secondary (NB2) national brands; (b) higher margins for the retailer; and (c) increased category demand ---all of which adds up to increased category profit relative to other positioning strategies. We test the implications of our analysis in three empirical studies. In a field study in two U.S. supermarket chains, observational data (labeling, package design, color, shelf placement, etc.) showed that the probability of a national brand being targeted by the store brand is an increasing function of its relative market share. In a second study we estimated cross price elasticities in 19 categories as a means of assessing inter-brand competition. In categories with high quality SB's, the cross-price effects do suggest that the SB and NB1 compete more intensely with each other than with NB2. In categories with low quality store brands, however, the cross-effects are more inline with the asymmetries observed in price / quality tier research. In a third product perception study, we found that although explicit targeting by store brands influenced consumer perceptions of physical similarity, it had no influence on consumers' perceptions of overall or product quality similarity. In fact, the SB was rated as more similar to the lower share national brands. And so while it appears that retailers do follow a positioning strategy consistent with our model, it meets with more limited success in changing consumer perceptions and demand side behavior. 
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I. Positioning of Store Brands
Store brands (SB's) or private labels are created and controlled by retailers. In aggregate they constitute about 20% of unit sales (IRI 1998) and are among the top three brands in 70% of supermarket product categories (Quelch and Harding, 1996) . As is true for any brand, positioning of the store brand can have a big influence on its performance. Unlike the manufacturers of the national brands (NB's), however, the downstream retailer has a different objective function. Whereas national brand manufacturers try to maximize the profits from their own products, the retailer focuses on maximizing profits from the entire product category including profit from store and national brands (Hoch and Lodish, 1998) . We model how the retailer should position the store brand to maximize category profits within the context of a category with two national brands, one of which is stronger. This is important not only to retailers but also NB manufacturers who must coexist with store brands. We focus on (a) whether the store brand should target a specific national brand or follow a "in the middle" positioning and compete to a lesser degree with both NB's; and (b) if targeting is better, which NB should be targeted. Schmalensee (1978) noted that store brands often imitate the category leader, presumably to signal comparable quality at a lower price. Although the demand for the store brand may increase, the downside is that the demand for the targeted national brand may also decrease. Since the retailer should maximize category profits, it may not be optimal to have the store brand specifically compete against the national brand with the largest customer base.
Instead, adopting a mid-point position where the store brand competes to a lesser extent with both national brands may be better. The product positioning literature usually ignores the retailer. To the best of our knowledge, there is only one study which incorporates the difference in the objectives of the retailer and the national brand manufacturers into the positioning problem. Tyagi and Raju (1998) examine the pre-emptive positioning strategies of national brands when there is a national brand versus a store brand entrant. We focus on the store brand's positioning problem and attempt to find the exact optimal location in the symmetric case where both NB's are equally strong and the asymmetric case where one NB is stronger than the other.
We adopt a game theoretic approach and examine a market with two incumbent national brands one of which is stronger, and a store brand entrant. SB positioning essentially involves choosing the degree of competition between the store brand and each of the national brands. As such, positioning the store brand closer to one national brand should result in a higher cross price sensitivity between the two. Our analysis suggests that the retailer should position the store brand next to the stronger national brand. Further, compared other prospective strategies, this strategy is more profitable in categories where the leading national brand is stronger. If the national brands are equal in terms of strength, the store brand should target one. Our results also reveal that SB targeting of the leading national brand leads to (a) lower wholesale prices from the leading national brand (NB1) and also from the secondary brand (NB2); (b) higher margins for the retailer on national brands; (c) higher profits from the store brand; and (d) increased category demand ---all of which adds up to increased category profit relative to other positioning strategies.
We test the implications of our analysis in three empirical studies. In a field study in two U.S. supermarket chains, we gathered observational data (labeling, package design and color, shelf placement, etc.) regarding the targeting strategies of store brands in various categories. We found that if the store brand follows a targeting strategy, the category leader invariably is the target. Further, the probability of NB1 being targeted by the store brand is an increasing function of the its market share relative to its competitors. In a second study we used store-level data from A.C. Nielsen to examine demand−price relationships in 19 categories and estimate cross-price effects as a means of assessing inter-brand competition. In categories with high quality SB's, the cross-price effects do suggest that the SB and NB1 compete more intensely with each other than with NB2 (Bronnenberg and Wathieu, 1996) . In categories with low quality store brands, however, the cross-effects are more inline with the asymmetries observed in price/quality tier research (Blattberg and Wisniewski, 1989) . In a third study we collected product perception data. We found that consumers clearly could detect when store brands explicitly targeted NB1; consumers rated the physical similarity of the SB and NB1 much higher when the targeting was explicit rather than ambiguous. However, explicit targeting had no influence on consumers' perceptions of the SB and NB1 in terms of overall similarity or product quality similarity. In fact, the SB was rated as more similar to the lower share national brands (NB2 and NB3). And so while it appears that retailers do follow a positioning strategy consistent with our model, it meets with more limited success in changing consumer perceptions and demand side behavior.
II. The Model
We consider a market consisting of two national brand manufacturers, each offering one national brand sold through a common retailer. The retailer can introduce a store brand if it results in higher total category profits for the retailer. Our model extends previous work in this area by allowing the retailer to also decide how the store brand is positioned relative to the two national brands. For example, the retailer may choose to position the store brand "in-between" the two national brands, or may decide to target a particular national brand.
Demand Structure without the Store Brand: The demand for national brand i, denoted by q i , i = 1, 2, is assumed to be as follows:
where p i is the price of national brand i, a i ∈ (0, 1) is the base level of demand of national brand i, and θ ∈ (0, 1) is the cross-price sensitivity representing the degree of price competition between the two national brands. The proposed linear demand function is consistent with utility maximizing consumers with quadratic utility functions (see Shubik and Levitan 1980) . A different utility function could lead to another demand function (Lee and Staelin 2000) ;
however, the demand function used here appears to be consistent with market data (see Study 2 reported later). The demand structure outlined in (1) and (2) generalizes the demand model used in Raju, Sethuraman, and Dhar (1995) as it allows the base level of demand of the two national brands to be different. Overall category demand equals 1 when p 1 = p 2 = 0 implying that there is a bound on how much consumers will buy, a reasonable assumption for packaged goods. Below, we also assume that the marginal cost of NB's to the manufacturers is 0; so, prices are additional to the marginal cost.
Demand Structure with the Store Brand: In addition to the two national brands, we now include the store brand denoted by the subscript s in (3)-(5).
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where p S is the price of the store brand and a S ∈ (0, 1) is the base level of demand of the store brand. As in (1) and (2), θ is the cross-price sensitivity between the two national brands. In addition, δ i ∈ (0, 1), the price sensitivity between the store brand and national brand i, captures the extent to which the store brand competes with national brand i. As we shall discuss later in more detail, the δ i 's are affected by the positioning of the store brand. As in the case with only two NB's, overall category demand equals 1 when p l = p 2 = p S = 0. However, we will show that in equilibrium the introduction of a store brand leads to an increase in category volume due to a lowering of the average price in the category.
Additional Properties of the Demand Structure: Note that (3)-(5) have two price difference terms where as (1)-(2) contain only one price difference term. The 1/2 outside the weighted sum of the price difference terms in (3)-(5) is a normalization constant to ensure that the mere addition of another brand does not result in a higher demand. This normalization also results in a structure where demand is affected by own price and the difference between own price and the (weighted) average price of the competing brands in the product category.
It is also worthwhile to note that to keep the model tractable, we use the same parameter δ l in (3) as well as (5), and δ 2 in (4) as well as (5) implying that cross-price sensitivities are symmetric. In other words, a unit price difference between NB1 and the SB has the same effect on NB1 demand as it has on SB demand. However, it is important to recognize that this assumption does not restrict cross-price elasticities to be symmetric because the elasticities depend on δ i 's as well as the base level of demands (the a i 's).
Modeling the Store Brand Positioning Decision:
Recall that the parameters δ 1 and δ 2 in (3)-(5) capture the extent to which the store brand competes with the two national brands. In our framework, positioning corresponds to choosing δ 1 and δ 2 so as to maximize the retailer's category profits. In order to formally model the positioning decision, we assume that brands are located in an n-dimensional perceptual space. Let f(d) map the distance between the two brands into cross-price sensitivity. We assume that f(d) has the following characteristics.
f(d) should be a non-decreasing function of d:
This property implies that as the distance between the two brands increases, the cross-price sensitivity decreases. That is, d is inversely related to the δ I 's.
As d tends to ∞, f(d) should approach 0:
This property implies that if the two brands are positioned very far apart, they do not compete with one another.
As d tends to 0, f(d) should approach 1:
This puts an upper bound on δ i . Recall that the upper bound on θ is also 1.
4.
The same change in d should lead to a greater change in f(d) when d is small: This property assumes that a unit change in the store brand's position will have a greater impact on cross-price sensitivity when the store brand is closer to a national brand than when it is farther away. For example, imagine a product category characterized by a single perceptual dimension, and a brand is located at the origin. It seems reasonable to expect that a move by a second brand from 5 to 4 would have a smaller impact on price competition than a move from 2 to 1.
In addition to these four properties, if we restrict f(d) to be monotonic and continuous, then it follows that f(d) must be a strictly convex function of d.
One additional aspect of the model may be worth clarifying. Consider the specific case when the SB is positioned on NB1. In this case, we assume that δ 1 = 1 and δ 2 = θ. Hence, the cross-price sensitivity between the SB and NB2 is the same as the cross-price sensitivity between NB1 and NB2 because both the SB and NB1 are equidistant from NB2. However, once again, this does not imply that the cross-price elasticities are also the same because of differences in the base levels of demand (the a's) and prices.
Sequence of Decisions:
The assumed sequence of decisions is as follows.
• Stage 1: The retailer positions the store brand (δ 1 and δ 2 are determined).
• Stage 2: National brand manufacturers choose their respective wholesale prices w 1 and w 2 to maximize their respective profits.
• Stage 3: The retailer chooses retail prices p 1 , p 2 and p s to maximize category profits.
We assume that the national brand positions are fixed. Although NB's may prefer to reposition, it does not happen often even over the long run (Halstead and Ward, 1995) . We assume that the retailer procures the store brand at marginal cost and the cost is not affected by the chosen position. The marginal cost of production for all three brands is assumed to be equal and set to zero. We also do not model inter-store competition and do not account for the effect of other marketing variables such as advertising or personal selling.
III. The Analysis
The analysis consists of two parts. First we consider the symmetric case where all brands have equal base level demands. In this case, without losing generality, we set a 1 = a 2 = a S = 1. We then consider the asymmetric case where one of the national brands is stronger than the other. More specifically, we consider the case when a 1 > a 2 = a S . It is important to recognize that the main result reported in this case does not require the assumption that a 2 = a S .
The store brand can be weaker than the weaker national brand . However, allowing the two to be different makes the analysis and the expressions more complex. Equilibrium Profits, Demands, and Prices: The equilibrium expressions are reported in Table 1 . The analysis without the store brand is the same as above except there is no Stage 1.
Π ro represents the retailer profits when there is no store brand. Prior to the introduction of the store brand, profits, prices, and demands of the two NB's are equal. For illustrative purposes, we assume that the store brand targets NB1, therefore δ 1 = 1 and δ 2 = θ. We note from Table 1 that the retail and wholesale prices of both national brands decrease with the introduction of the store brand but the targeted national brand experiences a greater decrease -straightforward by using θ < 1. This is consistent with Halstead and Ward (1995) who report that the most common response of NB manufacturers to the increasing SB threat is to decrease their prices.
Table 1 Equilibria in a Category with Symmetric Brands
Before the Store Brand After the Store Brand Positioning this increase is larger on the targeted brand. In other words, the retailer is able to obtain better terms of trade from the targeted NB. The profits of both NB's decline after store brand entry; and the decrease is larger for the targeted NB. Finally, equilibrium category demand increases, and demand for both national brands decreases with the introduction of the SB because the overall category demand is relatively inelastic. However, the targeted NB does not lose as much demand as the non-targeted NB because of its lower equilibrium price.
Analysis of the symmetric case results in the following key insights:
• The optimal position of the store brand is on the line segment joining the two national brands.
• As long as the distance function is reasonably convex, it is best to target one of the national brands.
As the two national brands were assumed to be symmetric, targeting one is equivalent to targeting the other. Once we allow one national brand to be stronger than the other as well as the SB (a 1 > a 2 , a S ), we can resolve the issue of whether it is better to target the strong or the weak national brand. The main result is summarized in Propositions 2.
Proposition 2 If a 1 > a 2 = a S , the retailer's profit is higher if the store brand targets NB1 than when it targets NB2..
Proof: See Appendix.
Once again, it is important to note that a 2 = a S is not needed for Proposition 3 to hold. However, assuming the two to be equal, makes the analysis and the expressions simpler. Proposition 2 is consistent with Schmalensee (1978) . Here is the intuition for why targeting the strong national brand is more profitable for the retailer in the context of our model.
In the case where one of the national brands is stronger than the other, we find that targeting the stronger brand results in lower total national brand demand than targeting the weaker national brand. Furthermore, targeting the stronger national brand results in a lower average wholesale price. These two effects combined result in lower total manufacturer profits on national brands (combined profits of the two national brand manufacturers) when the store brand targets the strong national brand (as opposed to the weak national brand). Hence, targeting the strong national brand leads to a greater profit pressure on the manufacturers allowing the retailer to capture some of what is given up by the manufacturers. Therefore, it is not surprising that we find that the retailer's combined profits from the two national brand are higher when the strong brand is targeted as opposed to the weak brand. However, this is true only as long as the store brand is not too weak. Furthermore, retailer profits from the store brand are higher when it is targeted at the strong brand as opposed to the weak brand. These two combined result in a situation where targeting the strong national brand results in higher profits for the retailer than what it can get by targeting the weak national brand.
Equilibrium expressions for the asymmetric case with the store brand targeting the stronger national brand are summarized in Table 2 (note that a 1 is set to 1, without any loss of generality).
< Table 2 Proposition 3 states that in categories where the leading national brand is stronger relative to the weak national brand, the profit advantage of targeting the strong national brand is greater compared to either targeting the weak national brand.
In the symmetric case, we were able to show that targeting one of the national brands is better than being anywhere else on the line (Proposition 1). In the asymmetric case, while we have demonstrated analytically that targeting the strong brand leads to higher profits than targeting the weaker national brand (Proposition 2), we were not able to show analytically whether positioning the store brand on the line segment results in lower profits than targeting the strong national brand. Profits when targeting the strong national brand or the weak national brand do not depend on the precise distance function. However, profits from other positioning choices on the line joining the two national brands do depend on the assumed distance function.
For the symmetric case, we were able to show analytically that targeting is better than any other positioning as long as the distance function is reasonably convex in d. We were not able to derive such a general result analytically for the asymmetric case. Therefore, for the asymmetric case, assuming a number of distance functions we conducted numerical analysis, and in each of these cases, it turned out that targeting NB1 results in higher profits than positioning anywhere else on the line segment joining the two NB's. Even for the linear distance function, which corresponds to the limiting case for convexity, targeting the leader is optimal unless the weak national brand is sufficiently strong. This implies that the convexity condition on the distance function weakens when the national brands are asymmetric.
Empirical Studies
In this section we present three empirical studies that test implications of our analysis.
Study 1: Observational Data on Store Brand Positioning
A key finding in the theoretical analysis is that the store brand should locate next to the leading national brand (Proposition 2). We may not observe this strategy in all product categories, but if the store brand does follow a targeting strategy the target should be the leading brand. In addition, because the relative profitability of targeting NB1 is an increasing function of asymmetries in national brand strength (Proposition 3), the probability that a store brand targets the leading national brand should be higher in categories where the leader is strong. Because retailers do not disclose the strategies followed, especially at the category level, we collected observational data.
Data and Methodology.
In two leading US grocery chains, two observers collected data regarding the positioning / targeting strategies of the store brands. Store brand products are easily identified by the brand names. Observers evaluated the available extrinsic cues, and judged the positioning strategy of the store brand products. The specific dimensions used in the evaluation were: (i) package design; (ii) labeling / color; (iii) shelf placement; and (iv) shelf talkers ("Compare and Save" signage) − if any. Prior research has found that consumers evaluate store brands based on such extrinsic cues (Richardson, Dick, and Jain, 1994) . Each observer made a binary judgment, either clear or ambiguous targeting. Using the conservative criterion of close matches on all extrinsic dimensions, observers agreed 85% of the time; disagreements were resolved through discussion. When both observers agreed that the store brand was trying to compete with a specific national brand, the brand name of the targeted product was recorded. Examples of clear and ambiguous targeting are shown in Figure 1 . Results. In 25 of the 64 (39%) categories in Store A and 18 of 56 (32%) categories in Store B, the store brand followed a targeting strategy. In the remaining categories, the store brand either did not follow a targeting strategy or targeted multiple national brands. Although at first glance the overall level of targeting seems fairly low, it should be pointed out that it is not that easy for the SB to differentially target only one NB. The reason is that due to commoditization or constraints in packaging technology, many national brands look reasonably similar.
We use unit market share as a proxy for the strength (base demands) of the products.
We determined the leading national brands and their market shares from IRI's Marketing Fact Book which is based on a panel of representative households. For the categories in which the store brand targets a national brand, we compared the brand name of the target product with the highest unit share brand listed in the Fact Book. Note that the market shares for a particular retailer may be different than the national level market shares. We identified that in 21 out of 25 product categories of Store A, and in 15 out of 18 categories of Store B, the target was the category leader. This finding is consistent with our first prediction that store brands generally target the category leader if and when they follow a targeting strategy.
To test our second prediction, we estimated separate logit models for Stores A and B based on the following variables:
Targeting Strategy of the Store Brand (TS).
We use a dichotomous variable to represent whether the store brand in the category targets the leading national brand or not. Hence, for Store A TS = 1 for 21 categories, and TS = 0 for 43 categories. The respective numbers for Store B are 15 and 41.
Market Shares of Leading National Brands (MS 1 and MS 2 ).
We identified the top two national brands based on unit volume shares from the Marketing Fact Book for each of the product categories employed. The underlying assumption is that the effect of other / weaker national brands on the store brand positioning is limited. MS 1 and MS 2 represent the unit shares of the highest and second highest share national brands respectively.
Number of National Brand in the Category #NB and Category Size (M).
We include these covariates to take into account other plausible explanations of the retailer's store brand strategy. One can argue that targeting a specific national brand may not be the optimal if there is a large number of national brands in the category. The number of national brands in the category (#NB) is obtained from the Fact Book by identifying the number of distinct brand names. We do not have a strong prior regarding the effect of the category size. However, incremental profits obtained by the targeting strategy are higher in a large category (although the relative profitability does not depend on the category size). Therefore, in large categories the retailer may formulate the positioning strategy more carefully, and the store brand is more likely to target the leading national brand. Category size (M) is obtained by multiplying the category volume and the average price in the category.
We estimated binary logit models for both Stores A and B. In both specifications, the log-odds ratio pertains to TS which represents whether the store brand targets the leading national brand (TS = 1) or not (TS = 0). In the first model we use MS 1 as a predictor variable.
The intuition is that in a two national brand world, MS 1 is sufficient to capture the strength of the leading national brand. However, when there are more than two national brands, relative strength of the leading national brand with respect to the secondary brand may be a more realistic In the first model MS 1 is the only significant variable for both data sets, and its effect is in the hypothesized direction. In categories where the market share of the top national brand is higher, the probability of observing a store brand that targets the leader increases. The effect of MS 1 / MS 2 is significant in the second model, although the significance is smaller for Store B.
This implies that if the leading national brand is stronger relative to the underdog, it is more likely to be a target for the store brand. The effect of the number of national brands in the category on the targeting strategy of the store brand is only significant (p = 0.095) for Store A under the second logit specification. Category size does not seem to effect the positioning strategy of the store brand for both data sets and models.
Discussion. Study 1 provides evidence that if the store brand follows a targeting strategy the target is, indeed, the leading national brand. We also found that the targeting strategy of the store brand depends on the (relative) market share of the leading national brand.
A limitation of this first study is that it considered only two grocery chains and may not generalize to other retailers. More importantly, however, the data do not provide any direct evidence on whether the targeting strategy has the intended influence on either consumers' perceptions of store brands or their buying behavior. A positioning strategy is a means for the retailer, and whether or not a store brand is successful in competing with the leading brand is still an empirical question. The next two studies address these issues.
Study 2: Inferring SB-NB Competitive Relationships from Secondary Data
Our model predicts that it is optimal for the store brand to choose a position closer to NB1 thereby resulting in greater competition between NB1 and the SB than between NB2 and the SB or NB1 and NB2.
Predicted Pattern of Cross-Price Effects:
The three demand equations outlined in (3)- (5) 
Let us define β i j to be the effect of price of Brand i on the demand of Brand j. For example, β 1 s represents the effect of NB1's price on SB demand. Recall that when the store brand targets the leading national brand, it follows that δ 1 =1, δ 2 =θ. Furthermore, θ is less than 1 and so δ 1 >δ 2 =θ. Keeping these in mind, (6)- (8) suggest the inequality relationships summarized in Column 2 of Table 4 . 
It may also be worthwhile to contrast the predictions of our model with the predictions from price/quality tier research (e.g., Blattberg and Wisniewski 1989; Allenby and Rossi 1991) .
Assuming that NB1 is in the top tier, NB2 is in the next quality tier, and the store brand is in the lowest quality tier, price/quality tier research would make the predictions shown in Column 3. 
Data and Methodology:
We utilized syndicated sales data from A.C. Nielsen for 19 product categories and 122 retailers operating in the top 50 US markets. In each of the categories, a store brand was sold by more than 50% of the retailers. For each retailer, the data base includes brand level information (unit sales, prices, and promotions) on a four week basis for each category over 30 periods (February 1993 through May 1995 . As in Study 1, we assume that the effects of additional smaller share brands on the store brand strategy is limited.
To take into account the effects of other national brands, we combined them into an omnibus "third" national brand.
We assume that the store brand positioning strategy is determined at the retailer level and not modified over the 30 four week periods. Therefore we identified the category leader, the secondary brand, and other national brands separately for each retailer based on unit sales over the 30 periods. Hence, what we are measuring does not pertain to specific national brands, but to the leader and the secondary national brand for each retailer. For each of the 19 categories, we estimated demand functions for the store brand, and the leading and secondary national brands using a linear specification. 1 The demand of a product is a function of the retail prices and sales promotions.
We use the following notation. Let i = 1, 2, and 3 refer to national brands, and S refers to the store brand. The subscript r = 1, ..., 122 refers to the 122 different retailers in the data.
Finally, the subscript t = 1, ..., 30 represents each of the four-week periods over which we have the data. Our key measures are defined next.
Demand for National Brand i (Q irt ).
We use equivalent units as the basis for demands. Hence, the demand for a national brand is the pound (or ounce) sales. i = 1 designates the leading national brand based on the sales in retailer r, and i = 2 is the secondary national brand. The demand for national brand i = 3 is the sum of the demands for the other national brand products in the category.
Demand for the Store Brand (Q Srt ). Likewise, we use the equivalent unit sales of the store brand in the analysis. In the 19 categories employed here, store brands are present in 75% of the retailer-category combinations. Conditional on the presence, average store brand share across categories and retailers is 28%.
Retail Prices (P irt , P Srt ). Retail prices are also based on equivalent units. Equivalent unit prices are obtained by dividing the dollar sales by the number of equivalent units. P 3rt is the weighted average price of the other national brands. The prices are effective prices net of promotions rather than regular prices.
Indicator for Sales Promotions (D irt , D Srt ).
These dummy variables represent whether the corresponding brand was promoted in the particular retailer and period. Because sales promotions are often accompanied by a price reduction, there is some degree of negative correlation between the sales promotion indicator variables and the corresponding price. However, these simple correlations are less than 0.2 in magnitude. We note that D 3rt is the percentage of the promoted brands in the "other brands" basket, since i = 3 consists of multiple products.
Indicator for Retailers (R r ).
We included these dummy variables to account for the variation in demand across retailers. Basically R r = 1 if the data point comes from retailer r, and 0 otherwise. More detailed discussion will be presented below.
We estimate the following models for each of the 19 product categories: 
where Q, P and D represent demand, price and availability of sales promotions respectively.
Equations (9), (10), and (11) are estimated separately, and they designate the demands for the leading national brand, the secondary brand, and the store brand. Note that in the empirical model, the demand and price terms are relative to their averages within respective retailers, P ir.
and Q ir. are averages within retailer r. Retailer indicator variables capture the differences in base levels of demand due to possible differences in consumer demographics, retail competition etc.
Prior research (Bronnenberg and Wathieu 1996; Dhar and Hoch 1997) has shown that the quality of the store brand is a key determinant of performance. Therefore we divided the categories into high (n=10) and low quality (n=9) groups using data from Hoch and Banerji (1993) . Our main interest here is the j k β terms (j = 1, 2, S, and k = 1, 2, 3, S). In order to summarize the results for the high and low store brand quality groups, we combined the estimates for each group by weighting each coefficient according to its precision (the inverse of its standard error squared). In all, we obtained a total of twelve β k j 's for each group. These represent the effect of brand k's price on the demand for brand j.
Results: As summarized in Table 5a -b, the estimated pattern of cross-price effects depends crucially on store brand quality. Within rows and columns, all estimates are significantly different from each other; except 0.165 and 0.157 in Column I of Table 5a . The average adjusted R 2 from 19 × 3 = 57 regression models is 0.72. Note that the dependent variables in Equations (9)- (11) are ratios to the average demands. We also calculated the estimated demands by multiplying the estimations from the above models with the corresponding averages. The average simple correlation between the actual demands and the estimated demands is 0.94. The models explain the data quite well thereby providing support for our assumed demand structure. The price and promotion variables together explain around 0.25 of the variation.
The estimated cross-price effects are compared with the main predictions of our model in Table 4 . Overall, the cross-price effects for categories with higher quality store brands are reasonably consistent with our model. The most striking result is that the effect of SB price on NB1 demand (β s 1 ) is more than both the effect of NB2 price on NB1 demand (β 2 1 ) and NB1
price on NB2 demand (β 1 2 ), i.e., Rows 3 and 4 of Table 4 . This is consistent with our conjecture that the SB should be positioned closer to NB1 and is counter to the prediction of the price/quality tier theory. Overall, the estimated effects for high quality store brands are by and large consistent with the predictions of our model. It is equally striking that some of the results for the categories with low quality store brands do not support our model, and in fact are in line with previous price/quality tier research. Specifically, prices of both NB's have a greater impact on SB demand than vice versa. Moreover, the SB appears to compete more with NB2 than with NB1.
Discussion. Overall, Study 2 offers some limited support for our model. In categories with higher quality store brands, it does appear that the SB and NB1 compete with each other to a greater extent than they do with NB2. Such is not the case for the low quality store brand categories. What might explain the difference? One possibility is that retailers pursue different positioning strategies depending on the quality of the store brand that they can procure. When they can buy a store brand that is comparable to national brand quality, they follow the predictions of our model and position against the leading national brand. When store brand quality cannot match that offered by the NB's, the retailer treats the SB as an inferior good and positions it against the weaker NB's. Alternatively, let us assume that the retailer follows the dictates of our model irrespective of store brand quality, always positioning against the leading NB. The observed results for low quality categories could also arise if the consumer simply does not accept the position that the retailer stakes out for their SB. In this case consumers may readily perceive the retailer's intent to position the SB against NB1 based on extrinsic characteristics but still not accept that the SB offers a similar level of intrinsic product quality.
We address these issues in Study 3. similar to 7=very dissimilar scale; the type of rating task was manipulated between subjects.
There also were three within subjects manipulations. The first variable was whether or not the SB targeted one specific NB. Using data from Study 1 we selected four categories where the store brand clearly targeted one of the NB's, in all cases here NB1; in the other four categories, there was no clear target. The second variable was the location of the SB relative to NB1. Either the SB was adjacent to NB1 (NB2, NB1, SB, NB3) or it was separated (NB1, NB2, NB3, SB). Although this manipulation had absolutely no impact, we thought a priori that adjacency might increase similarity. Finally, we manipulated the price differential between NB1 and the SB; either the SB sold at a 15% or 30% discount to NB1. Again, although this variable also had no impact on similarity ratings, we thought that consumers would be more likely to believe that SB quality was comparable to that of NB1 when the price differential was smaller. To summarize, the overall design was an 3 rating task x 8 category x 6 brand pairs x 2 level of targeting x 2 level of location x 2 level of price mixed design with rating task a between subjects variable and level of targeting, price differential, and location nested under category. We also collected supplemental information about store brand familiarity, usage and attitudes.
Results. The results were robust, simple, and therefore easy to interpret. As mentioned previously, there were no systematic effects due to the price or location manipulations. The results are displayed graphically in Figure 2 . 
NB 1 Target Ambiguous Target
The six pairwise similarity judgments are broken down by type of rating task: overall similarity, product quality similarity, and physical appearance similarity. For purposes of comparing means, the critical range is 0.27. As can be seen, the pattern of similarity ratings differ systematically depending on the rating task. Both the overall similarity and product quality similarity ratings produce comparable results. Specifically, all of the NB's are seen as fairly similar (mean of 3.0 for overall and 2.7 for quality similarity). In contrast, the SB is viewed as less similar to each of the NB's (mean=4.2), especially NB1 (mean=4.5). The results for overall and product quality similarity hold regardless of whether the SB specifically targeted NB1 or targeting was ambiguous.
A different pattern is obtained for the ratings of physical appearance . In the third panel of Figure 2 , we can see that in comparison to the top two panels NB1 and the SB are rated as significantly more similar whereas all five other pairs are rated as less similar (all p's<.01).
The last panel in the figure shows that these results are qualified by an interaction with the targeting variable. Specifically, when the SB purposefully targets NB1, consumers readily detect the similarity in physical appearance (3.0 vs 5.1). In addition, targeting reduces perceived similarity between the SB and both NB2 (4.9 vs 5.2) and NB3 (4.1 vs 4.7). Finally, because perception data are influenced by relative context, targeting also reduces perceptions of similarity between NB1 and both NB2 (3.1 vs 4.3) and NB3 (3.7 vs 4.2).
And so the overall picture that emerges from study 3 is as follows. When the retailer specifically targets the leading national brand, such attempts do succeed to the extent that consumers easily perceive the proximal position of the SB relative to NB1 in physical similarity space. Moreover, this positioning tactic also tends to distance both the SB and NB1 from the other NB's. However, it appears that consumers interpret this positioning in a very literal and narrow manner. And so what does not happen is that there is any discernible carry over from physical appearance space to perceptions of either product quality similarity or overall similarity. Explicit targeting had no influence on consumers' perceptions of the SB and NB1 in terms of overall similarity or product quality similarity. In fact, the SB was rated as much similar to the lower share NB2 and NB3.
Conclusions
Retailers are, or at least should be, interested in category profits rather than the profit from any specific brand. In this paper, we examined how the retailer's objective function reveals itself in the optimal positioning strategy of the store brands. The present framework considers positioning as choosing the degree of competition between the store brand(s) and each of the national brands in the product category. Assuming a category with two national brands, we find that the store brand should be positioned closer to the stronger national brand.
In addition, targeting is relatively more profitable in categories where the leading national brand is stronger. We tested the implications of the analysis with three empirical studies. We provide evidence that the store brands indeed target the leading national brand in the category (Study 1) . We also analyze demand-price relationships in 19 categories and find limited support for our conjecture that differential positioning leads to greater competition between the store brand and the leading national brand (Study 2). We find that even though consumers can readily detect retailers efforts to use extrinsic cues to position against the leading national brand, this does not necessarily translate into consumer perceptions that the store brand offers comparable intrinsic quality (Study 3).
Our analysis indicates that the retailer prefers to have a store brand which competes heavily with the national brands. The basic premise here is that it can not increase both cross price sensitivities δ 1 and δ 2 at the same time. The conceptual space in which the positioning game takes place allows us to represent the tradeoff between δ 1 and δ 2 . In the presence of this tradeoff, it is better to have a high δ 1 than a high δ 2 . Hence, there is a rationale for the tendency of store brands to imitate the category leader.
Our contribution is twofold. On the theoretical side, we address the store brand positioning problem. On the empirical side, we provide evidence that the store brands in fact aspire to compete with the category leader; although there is mixed evidence that they are successful in doing so. Our empirical analysis also suggests that the competitive effects between the store brand and the leading and secondary national brands respectively, are larger than the effects between these national brands.
There is empirical evidence that store brands do particularly well in categories with high concentration (Dhar and Hoch, 1997) . Rubel (1995) suggests that store brands do better because it is easier for consumers to compare the store brand when there is a distinct category leader. Dhar and Hoch (1997) argue that store brand can pursue a focused positioning strategy in a concentrated market characterized by less heterogeneity in tastes, and offer an attractive alternative with a lower price. Our analysis is in line with Dhar and Hoch (1997) , and we claim that the focus of that positioning strategy should be the leading national brand.
One can devise scenarios in which targeting the category leader may not be the optimal strategy. For example, if the secondary national brand provides a much lower margin than the leader, retailer may be better of by diverting the sales of the secondary national brand to the store brand. Alternatively, in some categories targeting strategy may lead to negative inferences in the consumers' minds. They may prefer to buy the "real thing" rather than the "lower quality copycat". In this case the retailer may prefer to make its brand as distinct as possible. It is also possible that being closer to the customer may help the retailer identify the unfulfilled needs or a niche market, thus may lead to a differentiated product strategy. Note that our framework does not explicitly link the distribution of consumer preferences to the positioning problem. In one sense this is restrictive, but on the other hand it allows us to examine the problem without assuming a specific preference structure.
